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Products Liability
Harmonization:
A Uniform Standard
Rebecca Korzec
Uni'Versity of Baltimore
The purpose of products liability laws is
to create safer products. In our global economy,
a uniform approach to products liability law is
the most effective means of fulfilling this purpose. American manufacturers market their
products nationally and internationally. Worldwide, consumers buy products marketed
through all means of interstate and international
commerce, including the Internet. For this reason, any single product may be regulated by a
variety of different state or international products liability laws. The application of these inconsistent rules may discourage essential manufacturer decision-making, may have a discriminatory impact upon some product manufacturers and users, and may lead to externalization of
accident costs.
Among industrialized nations, the United
States is unique in addressing tort law at the
state rather than the national level. For example, Australia and Canada, which share a common-law heritage with the United States, have
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federal tort systems. The United States approach may be appropriate in some tort settings,
such as in the premises liability or motor vehicle accident context (not involving a claim of
products liability), where the state rule's impact
remains within that state's geographical boundaries. Unlike the simple "fender-bender", which
occurs within the borders of one state, the typical product is manufactured and marketed nationally or internationally. Therefore, several
factors suggest that uniform federal treatment of
product liability laws may be a more desirable
means of regulation.
First, conflicting state rules create an absence of predictable standards for manufacturers. For example, while some states may employ
the consumer expectations test for determining
product defects, others may apply the risk utility test. To be efficient, manufacturers must
mass-produce and market their products nationally. However, they may find it cumbersome, if not impossible, to comply with the conflicting rules of the various states in which the
product is made or marketed. Manufacturers
cannot always redesign their products to meet
competing, inconsistent state requirements.
Thus, conflicting rules not only discourage essential manufacturer planning and decisionmaking, they also jeopardize product design and
safety. In sum, experimentation by the states in
creating their own doctrines and regulations,
[26)
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one of the supposed benefits of decentralization,
actually may become a detriment.
Second, state lawmakers may legislate an
inherent bias into products liability law, adopting rules that advance parochial interests, which
favor resident product injury victims over national manufacturers. Conversely, a state may
manipulate its product liability rules to advance
its political or economic development goals,
thereby creating a pro-manufacturer bias. This
can be explained, at least in part, by some basic
realities of the legislative process. Business or
insurance interests, who possess substantial
funds to underwrite intensive lobbying campaigns, may influence state legislators to create
a more hospitable environment for out- of- state
manufacturers. By contrast, product consumers
not only underestimate product risks 2 , they also
may underestimate the potential benefits of organized legislative advocacy. J As a result, product users may overlook these activities, giving
little reward to legislators who adopt a prol

1 See, e.g. Blankenship 'D. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E. 2d 781
(W.Va. 1991), in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia
stated that, where a split of authority exists about which crashworthiness rule to apply, the court should choose the rule more
favorable to the plaintiff.
2 See, e.g. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, "Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation," 112
Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999). See also, Gary T. Schwartz, "Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law," 38 Ariz. L.
Rev. 917,936 (1996).
J [d., Schwartz at 937.
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consumer stance. 4 Thus, it is not surprising that
most legislative tort reform favors insurance
companies and sellers.S The federal government
can play an important neutralizing role in preventing such manipulation by states.
Third, because most products are manufactured and marketed nationally and internationally, the market for many products is sufficiently global to justify federal and international
regulation. Congress already has recognized the
advantages of uniform federal treatment of
products liability issues. Nationally, the Food
and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration are current examples of this federal approach.
There may be disadvantages inherent in
the imposition of uniform federal products liability laws. State lawmaking is viewed as advancing autonomy, self-reliance, individualism,
and independence. To the extent that states are
prevented from controlling products liability
laws, these goals may not be realized. Moreover,
uniform national standards may ignore local
voter concerns. Similarly, innovation, economic
development, political representation, and voter

[28]
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interests may be burdened by national standards that seem difficult to implement.
Can the obstacles created by non-uniformity
be removed through the application of choiceof-law rules? A number of proposals have been
advanced, including: 1) applying the state law
where the manufacturer has the greatest number of employees; 2) applying the state law
where the product is first sold; 3) permitting
manufacturers to designate the applicable state
law. 6
Having seen the existence of nonuniformity and state law bias in American products liability law, it is important to consider
these in the global context. The arguments in
favor of federalization of products liability apply
to globalization, as well. How might internationallaw respond effectively to these concerns?
First, a comprehensive code or treaty might internationalize all aspects of global products liability law. One immediate problem with this
approach is whether products liability policy
concerns would be addressed adequately, or
whether they would be subjected to parochial
political decisions. Unfortunately, politicization
could jeopardize product safety if individual regimes conSCiously or inadvertently create disin-

6 Schwartz,

supra note 2 at 937.
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centives to safety and health measures by adopting rules that favor sellers.
Tobacco, as a product, offers a compelling
argument for global regulation.
The World
Health Organization estimates that about 5 million people a year die from tobacco-related disease, including about 400,000 a year in the
United States alone. This annual global death
count is projected to be more than 8 million by
2020 and 10 million by 2030. 7 Seventy percent
of these deaths will occur in developing countries. S As industrialized nations combat the tobacco industry, these international companies
focus their marketing efforts on developing nations.
Should the international tobacco problem
be controlled by international treaty? In 1999,
the World Health Assembly (WHA) , the governing body of the World Health Organization,
agreed to have the WHO create a tobacco control treaty. The World Health Assembly adopted
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) on May 23, 2003. The FCTC, a legally
binding treaty, is the first international public
health treaty. It encourages countries to recog-

7 Framework Convention Alliance-The Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control-FAQ; available at
http://www.fctc.org/about FCTClindex.shtml
S [d.
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nize and combat the global hazards presented
by tobacco-related disease. 9
The WHO justifies the need for an international treaty in several ways. First," [t]he tobacco epidemic is an international problem."10
Second, "[t]he tobacco industry is a global industry" .II Third, "[ t] obacco industry marketing
campaigns executed across a number of different countries simultaneously, including through
satellite television; .... " require global solutionsY
The ultimate question is what might such
a treaty accomplish? What might collective action by the world's nations accomplish that the
nations cannot achieve by their own initiatives?
The treaty addresses measures that require international cooperation, such as regulating international advertising and combating international smuggling. These problems should receive priority in an international treaty because
they require collective action and resources.
Individual countries would receive benefits that
they could not achieve on their own.
Moreover, a treaty focused on truly international issues is more likely to receive support

Id.
I°Id.
11 Id.
12Id.

9
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for two reasons. First, individual countries may
actually appreciate the benefits they will derive
from these cooperative efforts. Second, the requirements imposed upon each individual country may not be burdensome. Nevertheless, countries with strong national tobacco control regimes may reject an international treaty that
addresses substantive domestic policy. These
nations with existing domestic controls may
view their regimes as more effective than they
might be under an international agreement.
Moreover, they may fear that limited international controls could undercut strong domestic
rules already in place. 13
The framework international treaty may
be viewed as a significant world health measure,
encouraging nations to act collectively against
global tobacco companies. Ultimately, tobacco
control requires changing the attitudes of
masses of people to make smoking unacceptable. Without an international approach to the
global tobacco industry, such changes are
unlikely to occur. The treaty is a timely and instructive example of global product regulation
by a uniform standard.

13
Derek Yach and Douglas Bettcher, "Globalisation of tobacco industry influence and new global responses." Tobacco
Control 2000; 9:206-216.
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In sum, a uniform approach to products
liability laws is the most effective means of creating safer products. Uniformity diminishes the
ability of state lawmakers to advance merely parochial interests, or to favor business interests
at the expense of the consumer. Finally, on an
international level, uniformity advances global
solutions to global problems.
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